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Spectacular accomplishments in biomedical research have given birth to what is now per-
ceived as a biological revolution, an epoch in which man has acquired the skill to manipulate
the fundamental unit of heredity, the gene.
This revolution carries with it the prospect of remarkable opportunities to improve the qual-
ity of life and to probe with increasing precision the mysteries of cellular organization and
function. It comes, however, at a time when the opportunity to exploit this new knowledge
may be limited by a significant reduction in federal support of basic research, and a situation
which prompts universities and other centers of scientific activity to seek funding from in-
dustrial patrons. This trend has generated a new constellation of institutional challenges, for
one apparent result of industrial sponsorship of university-based biomedical research is a
threat to university governance as altered allegiances emerge and as the potential for financial
gain appears almost limitless. This essay explores background issues leading to these new
alliances, seeks to identify some of the central problems emerging for university ad-
ministrators, faculty, and students, and then poses a key question: Can industrial support for
university-based biomedical research fill the apparent short-fall in federal dollars in the
foreseeable future? An analysis of available data indicates that this outcome is unlikely either
now or in the years ahead.
American biomedical research organizes around a triangle of interests formed by
industry, universities, and government. These same institutions provide the
laboratories for virtually all of this research activity; the federal government serves as
the primary patron. The federal role in developing and sustaining the nation's
biomedical research capacity is almost universally acknowledged, and the success of
the NIH is a monument to this commitment. Even in this day of budgetary con-
straints, the federal responsibility has been reaffirmed by both the administration
and the Congress.
I have chosen to call this biomedical research complex a triple helix, borrowing
from the language of cell biology. The analogy seems serviceable for it suggests that
the triple helix, like the double helix, has both structural and functional attributes.
Just as intracellular feedback modulates DNA function, so the need to balance the
intellectual independence ofthe scientist with the industrial appetite for commercial
opportunity tempers the partners in the triple helix. Within this structure the federal
partner is held accountable to assure that the public dollar is spent in the public in-
terest both directly and indirectly.
239
Presented in part at a Symposium "Academic-Industry Interactions," sponsored by the American
Society of Biological Chemists; Meeting of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental
Biology, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 18, 1982
Address reprint requests to: Charles U. Lowe, M.D., National Institutes of Health, Building 1, Room
238, Bethesda, MD 20205
Copyright © 1982 by The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.The tensions within the academic world which justify this timely review of
industry-university relations emerge from a concatenation of events. The capstone
of achievement which led to the biological revolution so dazzled the scientific world
that comparatively little attention has been given to the other notable incidents that
have influenced its immediate effect. It is these modifying events that deserve our at-
tention, for they appear to be central to the assessment of the new patterns of
industry-university relations.
1. The most critical event was the scientific achievement of gene splicing-the
ability to insert genetic instruction into a cell and thus endow it with the capability of
producing a predetermined gene product.
2. This achievement was soon followed by the Supreme Court sanction for
patenting manmade cellular configurations, in effect establishing in law that
fabricated genes have a commercial value.
3. Following this, a patent court instructed the U.S. Patent Office to issue patents
for products of this nature.
4. Simultaneously, the Congress modified patent statutes by conveying to univer-
sities the ownership of patents developed with federal support by their faculties.
5. At the same time there occurred a sharpening ofcompetition for the ever more
slowly growing federal research dollar, and other research funds seemed in short
supply.
6. And once again scientists in profit-making organizations had equal standing
with university scientists in seeking NIH grants, a situation which had not existed
since 1968.
7. The political climate in which this drama unfolded was favorable to commer-
cializing new technologies, particularly those developed with federal funding.
8. Finally, the universities held the key patents for recombinant DNA technology
and supported a large pool of knowledgeable scientists, strategically placed to ex-
ploit this technology.
If these events had occurred at different times, history would have found each
noteworthy. The fact that all occurred within a remarkably short period of time
created a scientific epoch. They appear to have taken most of the major players by
surprise. It is astonishing that risk capital to develop the new technology appeared so
quickly. Investors had limited experience in judging the commercial value of
biotechnical innovation, and for the most part knew neither the prospective market
nor the nature of the products.
Before the eyes of faculty as well as university corporations appeared a ver-
tiginous vision of riches beyond the dreams of avarice. This apparition became real-
ity and grew spectacularly from a glimmer in the eye of some imaginative scientists
to a whole new industry comprising 400 corporations and partnerships. Capitaliza-
tion is estimated at 1 billion dollars and projected profits over the next decade may
reach 40 billion dollars.
The U.S. Patent Office needed a new type of personnel, examiners capable of
contending with the biomedical jargon found in applications to patent modified liv-
ing organisms. Universities also were caught unaware, for most had no patent of-
fice, let alone a patent policy. Of the 1,200 institutions to which NIH awards grants
or contracts only 82 had an Institutional Patent Agreement with NIH.
Many industrialists were equally unprepared. Some imaginative executives quickly
realized the commercial possibilities ofwhat had been a scientific activity conducted
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principally in university laboratories. They proceeded to seek information from
knowledgeable scientists, patents and licenses from universities, and access to
university laboratories. And when opportunities for joint ventures with university
scientists were infeasible, at least 40 major corporations took equity positions in the
most attractive of the new high technology ventures to establish a financial position
in this rapidly expanding field.
The frenetic action appears to be abating, though the ferment continues. Scien-
tists are weighing whether to remain in the academic world or accept entrepreneurial
opportunities. Concomitantly, government and the Congress are examining the
nation's position in biotechnology, to guage the impact on trade balances, as well as
on the growth of the gross national product.
The biological revolution has occurred within the context of established institu-
tional arrangements for conducting biomedical research and against a background
of an historically productive, albeit modest, interaction between industry and
universities. Why then is there a sudden, even dramatic and widespread interest in
reviewing existing arrangements? The simplest explanation is that in the past the
relations generally offered limited economic benefit for the university and the fac-
ulty. This is no longer the case, and, in addition, the level of federal and private non-
profit support for biomedical research is constrained.
Traditional university-industry interactions were limited largely to departments of
physical sciences, engineering, and chemistry, and consequently university bylaws
on consultation were generally designed to encompass low-key, but nonetheless im-
portant activities in non-biomedical fields. Just as the universities were unprepared
for the stresses generated by the biological revolution, so biomedical scientists may
have lacked the extensive and sophisticated experience of scientists in these other
disciplines.
The effect was to place unrestrained temptation before the scientist and the
university-a temptation neither was fully prepared to deal with realistically or ra-
tionally. If some abuses did take place, they forced universities to take stock, not
only to avoid problems in the future but also out of concern for their own image.
What differentiates the effect of recombinant DNA technology from the impact
of any other major scientific success? An examination of another technology which
came to fruition in the recent past is informative. The silicon-chip technology, in its
early stages, presented many similarities to the contemporary picture of bio-
technology: a scientific revolution; a huge influx of venture capital; the creation
of many small, high technology companies; opportunity for these companies to ac-
cumulate great wealth; and university faculty involvement as consultants and even
equity partners with the new industrialists. Despite these similarities, silicon
technology produced few of the destabilizing effects of the biological revolution.
What is the distinction between these scientific epochs? First, the prevailing patent
statutes gave few universities the chance to realize large sums of money from silicon-
chip technology. A second difference follows from the nature ofbiomedical science:
the investigators' apparent conservative attitude toward inventions and an increased
sense of professional responsibility.
Biomedical science was built upon and continues to interact with the health care
system and tends to recruit professionals with an orientation toward service, as if
responsibility for patient care carried with it an obligation to abjure large financial
rewards from scientific discovery. While, in truth, none could argue that the
biomedical investigator had taken an oath of poverty, this ethic dictated that the
241CHARLES U. LOWE
fruits of research belonged to the ill rather than to the inventor. For example, the
Harvard University medical faculty dedicated all patents to the public until 1975;
thereafter, it adopted an aggressive patent policy. There is an obvious ambiguity be-
tween the dedication of inventions to the public and the entrepreneurial side of
medicine.
Even though NIH had for almost two decades waived to medical schools the right
to patents developed with federal funds, during the silicon-chip revolution, an in-
ventor's share of royalties from federally supported research was severely restricted.
Under the new patent law, this ceiling has been lifted and the inventor can gain
handsomely if his patent proves to be commercially successful.
In addition, the salary structure in medical schools favored the faculty in the
clinical sciences. With the changes in the patent law, the basic scientist now has a
chance to gain substantial rewards from his research and to become the income peer
of his clinical counterpart. A final distinction can be made between the silicon-chip
revolution and that of recombinant DNA technology. The former technology obeys
the strict laws of supply and demand while the latter has its biggest economic poten-
tial in the ever-increasing health service market.
A survey of historical spending patterns (Fig. 1) by industry and the NIH for
health research and development (R&D) suggests the existence of three distinct
phases occurring in the years 1947-1960, 1961-1979, and 1980-1982, respectively.
During the first, industrial R&D dropped from 40 percent to 29 percent of the total,
while the NIH share rose from 9 percent to 32 percent. Almost immediately after the
war the NIH supported an ever-growing portion of health R&D activity while that
fraction funded by industry kept falling, reaching a low of 25 percent in 1955. Dur-
ing the two decades after 1960, NIH and industry were in relative equilibrium, with
the NIH funding about 38 percent of the total and industry about 25 percent. It is
noteworthy that the dollar mixture of research, development, and application are
very different in industry and NIH. For example, in 1980, basic research in the phar-
maceutical industry accounted for only 10 percent of the R&D dollar and applied
research for 44 percent of the total. In contrast, the NIH spent only about 12 percent
of its budget on development but 52 percent on basic research.
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FIG. 1. Support for Health R&D: Relationship Between NIH and Health Industry
Contributions.
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After 1979, the federal percentage of total health research declined while that of
industry increased sharply. Unfortunately, for 1980 and 1981, the years of greatest
relevance to this comparison, we have only a budgeted total for the former year and
estimates for the later, but several sources indicate that the changes are real.
Although the proportion of university research supported by industry seems to
have remained nearly constant, the manner in which the funds are spent has changed
sufficiently to attract national attention. In only a few years, almost a score of in-
dustries have entered into contracts with universities to support dedicated
laboratories for work in medical sciences. Though we know relatively little about the
details of these contracts-since information comes largely from media reports-
what we do know indicates that the new industrial largess generally supports work
related to the sponsors' products or to the markets they seek to enter. Universities
receive funds for laboratory support and in exchange the industry obtains either a
patent or an exclusive license to discoveries made in the laboratory it funds. It also
gains unique access to an institutional knowledge base that may be at the frontier of
science.
How should these shifts be interpreted? While there is no proven explanation, we
can derive a plausible one from a study of industrial support for basic resea;lch (Fig.
2). As measured in constant 1972 dollars, basic research funded by all industry fell
from $622 million in 1967 to $563 million in 1972 and then rose to $714 million in
1980 and $742 in 1981. Included in these figures is the industrial support for basic
research (in 1972 dollars) to universities and colleges ($39 million in 1967, $53
million in 1972, and $70 million in 1980). Thus, until 1980 industry had kept its
budget for basic research nearly constant. Instead, it invested dollars in applied and
developmental activities.
Returning to biomedical R&D during phase II, industry appears to have made a
conscious decision to depend upon university laboratories, supported largely by
NIH, to conduct the basic biomedical research that leads to new knowledge. Indeed,
estimates for fiscal year 1982 indicate that NIH supports 90 percent of all fundamen-
tal life science research in this country.
The revolutionary events coming in the decade of the 1970s, therefore, found in-
dustrial laboratories unprepared to exploit biomedical high technology and a staff
trained for other scientific activities. By 1980, industry had already begun to seek a
position in this field. The fastest way was to buy into existing programs. This deci-
sion to invest directly in ongoing or proposed university research offered a number
of other advantages. Industry moved from a non-starter to a position near the finish
line without incurring the major research costs of the technological breakthrough in
biology. The federal budget had provided those dollars.
The health-related industries acquired a stake in high technology laboratories in
areas of product interest, without having to make permanent commitments to staff
benefits, long-term support, and retirement, which were university responsibilities.
No industry could have hired such talent for in-house laboratories at so little cost.
Although the dollars committed to these dedicated laboratories may appear large,
they are spread out over a period of five to ten years and are small as compared with
the federal investment in these program areas. If marketable technology emerges
from these dedicated laboratories, the citizens of the nation will receive a double
benefit- new health products will appear on the market, and taxes will return the
NIH investment to the Treasury many times over. Time alone will tell whether the
equation is favorable to the nation or to industry, or indeed to both.
It remains unclear whether the developments in Phase III are felicitous to the
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biomedical science base of the nation. There is no evidence that total investment in
university-based bio-medical research (federal and industrial) is changing signi-
ficantly, so one must assume that we are witnessing a displacement or substitution
favoring a few select research centers. As industry-supported university laboratories
increase in number there is a danger that program balance will shift to activities
likely to provide short-term rewards. Industry must respond to stockholder pressure
and seek near-term payoff on investments, whereas the federal government has no
such responsibility. Industry will seek the best laboratories and the best scientists in
the best schools. The rich will get richer and the poor get no assistance. This is a real
cause for concern, since it exacerbates an existing imbalance. For example, the top
twenty research centers in this country, 1 percent of the total number, received 44
percent ofthe NIH budget. To the other 1,180 institutions with NIH grants and con-
tracts went the remaining 66 percent (Fig. 3).
And there is an additional danger that the goal of saleable products or processes
will supplant the search for knowledge. At the same time some of the best scientists
may be lured from the academic world and succumb to the inducements of profit-
making organizations. Overriding these considerations is the need to maintain free
and open discussion of scientific issues. Secrecy is antithetical to the vitality of
science but may become a reality if industrial needs for exclusive licenses and paten-
table inventions become the goal of university laboratories. Secrecy in science
presents a special concern to the NIH for its peer review system is built upon open
and candid communication by its grantees. The responsibilities of these primary
review groups cannot be met in an atmosphere of clandestine science, and a task
already difficult and demanding, as budget realities reduce the relative dollar pool
for support of science, will become impossible.
There is evidence from many sources that university administrators are concerned
about this matter, as well as many others, for a number ofmajor universities are ac-
tively discussing alternatives for maintaining the scholarly environment in the face
of formidable social and economic pressure.
A final matter deserves attention. Can or will industry invest in university-based
biomedical research at a level sufficient to compensate for the perceived short-fall in
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federal funding? While any answer must be a speculation, we can illuminate the
matter by examining the size of the dollar commitment by the private sector resting
in the balance. No scale exists to measure the appropriate budget for NIH. Funding
levels are the result of a variety of scientific and political judgments that reach
reconciliation in appropriations. One can, however, through indirection, obtain
some first-order estimates. During the past several years NIH has judged that it
would be desirable if competing grants in support of investigator-initiated research
were fixed at 5,000 per year.
The NIH budget for FY 1983 will support only 4,100 such project grants, lacking
$111 million to reach the desired number. Along with this, the budget request pro-
poses to reduce payments to research sponsors for indirect costs by 10 percent, at a
saving of $70 million. Finally the budget also presumes a reduction of 4 percent in
support of non-competing continuation grant applications, giving a further reduc-
tion of about $61 million. The total for these sums, $241 million, does not take into
account diminished activity in a variety of other research areas supported by NIH,
costing about $250 million. Thus, conservative estimates of the short-fall for FY
1983 lie between a minimum of $241 million and an upper level of about half a
billlion dollars.
This must be viewed against the private-sector allocation for health R&D which
was $2.8 billion in 1981. The private sector would have to divert 8 percent ofits 1981
R&D budget to university-based biomedical research to meet the lower level of
short-fall and 17 percent if it deemed funding at the higher level to be desirable. The
present commitment is at a level of about 3 percent.
In 1980, industry as a whole spent only 3 percent of its R&D budget on basic
research and 78 percent on development. For the drug industry in 1980 the com-
parable figure for basic research was 9.6 percent of $1.5 billion, or $144 million. If
industrial support for university-based biomedical research were to bridge the pro-
jected short-fall in the NIH budget and used funds only from its basic science
budget, it must commit a sum almost twice the dollar amount that the drug in-
dustries budgeted for basic research in 1981.
We are witnessing a period of quantum changes in our knowledge of biology. At
the same time, industry, universities, and government remain bound in a triple sym-
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FIG. 3. Distribution of NIH Funding to Universities and Colleges (excluding con-
struction)- 1981.
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biotic relation. Historians may question whether each component has responded ap-
propriately to a variety of societal and economic variables in an era of scientific
transition. If the checks and balances ofthe triple helix behave like those in the helix
of DNA, they will keep the component elements in the most productive relation.
It remains unclear what government can do to influence this process or even
whether it should be more than an interested observer. It must at least monitor the
changes, for the NIH has a huge investment in the science base of this country and a
responsibility to maintain the vitality and productivity of biomedical research. It
seems obvious that the private sector cannot commit sufficient funding to
biomedical research in universities at a level that will have substantial impact on any
but a selected few. Like the double helix of DNA, the triple helix of research,
government, industry, and the university, is a fact of life. It is, however, a complex
fact, dynamic and in evolution. Not enough time has passed to make ajudgment on
whether new support configurations will advance biomedical research, let alone sus-
tain its present sound foundation.